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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MORAL JUDGMENT AND PROFESSIONAL LEGITIMATION

W. BRADLEY WENDEL*

I. INTRODUCTION
In this essay I would like to consider the nature of the role of lawyers from
the point of view of both jurisprudence and the sociology of professions. From
this perspective it is apparent that the judgment characteristic of lawyers’
expertise is not primarily the exercise of ethical discretion. Rather, it is the
application of legal norms, which may incorporate moral principles by
reference, but which are analytically distinct from morality. Much of the
concern about lawyers “imposing their values” on clients, usurping clients’
decision-making authority, or acting as unelected priests of virtue seems to boil
down to a deep-seated skepticism about the superior capacity of lawyers to
make moral judgments, as compared with their clients. Nevertheless, many
legal ethics scholars maintain that “real” ethics, in the sense of a normative
theory of the lawyer’s role apart from merely complying with the law
governing lawyers,1 is primarily a matter of responding appropriately to the
same sort of moral considerations that figure into the practical reasoning of
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1. A short aside on terminology: Many lawyers use the term “legal ethics” to refer to the
disciplinary rules adopted by the highest court of a state and enforced through grievance
procedures (often administered by bar associations exercising delegated powers). Thus, in
common parlance lawyers say something is unethical when it violates a disciplinary rule or that
they have an ethical obligation to do such-and-such when it is required by a rule. The
disciplinary rules are part of the broader subject of the law governing lawyers, which also
includes the law of agency, torts, contracts, procedure, crimes, and specialized areas such as tax
and securities law, as they apply to the activities of lawyers. The teaching of law school
professional responsibility courses has increasingly emphasized the overlapping sources of
regulation to which lawyers are subject, and the leading casebooks and treatises now deal with
much more than just the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (upon which the disciplinary rules of most states are based). The usage of the word
“ethics” to refer to the disciplinary rules creates unnecessary confusion with the notion of ethics
as a theoretical inquiry into how one ought to live one’s life. In particular, the philosophical
discipline of normative ethics asks what kinds of actions are right or wrong, and what kind of a
life should one lead. See David Copp, Introduction: Normative Ethics and Metaethics, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY 3, 19 (2006). When I talk about ethical obligations,
values, principles, etc., I will always be referring to philosophical ethics, not the disciplinary
rules.
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agents in ordinary life. David Luban and Deborah Rhode, for example, have
argued that lawyers ought to accept personal moral responsibility for their
actions, even when acting in a representative capacity.2 If they are correct
about this, the task of legal education, and specifically of legal ethics
education, might include training lawyers to be better at making moral
judgments. In fact, there has been a fairly persistent (if minority) view that law
schools should assume some responsibility for improving the ethical decisionmaking capacities of students.3 On this view, the interesting pedagogical
question is how this should best be accomplished, with advocates tending to
favor “experiential” learning environments such as simulations, live-client
clinics, and pro bono representation.4 The traditional doctrinal law school
course, complete with casebooks and Socratic questioning, certainly does not
appear to have much to recommend, from the point of view of training better
moral decision-makers.

2. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 160–74 (1988);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 17
(2000) (arguing that lawyers should take “personal moral responsibility for the consequences of
their professional acts”); David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the LawyerClient Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1005 (1990)
(“Morally activist lawyers hold themselves morally accountable for the means they employ and
the ends they pursue on behalf of clients.”).
3. See, e.g., Tom C. Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249
(1975); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the Law Office, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 605 (1996); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO
THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP 203, Skill § 10 (1992) (known as the MacCrate Report; recognizing ethical
dilemmas is one skill that a competent lawyer must possess). The treatment of ethics by the
MacCrate Report is disappointing, because it never resolves the ambiguity between ethics in the
sense of the disciplinary rules and ethics as moral decision-making. For example, Skill §
10.1(b)(i)–(ii) talks about familiarity with primary sources of “ethical rules,” including the
disciplinary rules and other sources of the law governing lawyers, while Skill § 10.1(b)(v)–(vi)
refers to “[a]spects of ethical philosophy bearing upon the propriety of particular practices or
conduct” as well as “[a] lawyer’s personal sense of morality.” Id. at 203–05.
4. See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, Legal Ethics in Preparation for Law Practice, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 684, 695–96 (1996); Jill Chaifetz, The Value of Public Service: A Model for Instilling a Pro
Bono Ethic in Law School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1695 (1993); Robert Condlin, The Moral Failure of
Clinical Legal Education, in THE GOOD LAWYER 317 (David Luban ed., 1984); Stephen Gillers,
Getting Personal, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (1995); Carol Bensinger Liebman, The
Profession of Law: Columbia Law School’s Use of Experiential Learning Techniques to Teach
Professional Responsibility, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (1995); James E. Moliterno, Legal
Education, Experiential Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71
(1996); Shaffer, supra note 3, at 608–09.
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As strange as it may sound to tell future lawyers that they should not act on
the basis of their principled moral convictions,5 I believe that lawyers in fact
should refrain from exercising moral judgment on the basis of non-legal
values. Legal ethics differs in kind from ordinary ethics because the social
function of the law is to settle normative disagreement procedurally and to
adopt a provisional social settlement of moral conflict that precludes acting on
the basis of ordinary first-order moral reasons. Because lawyers acting in a
representative capacity are agents for their clients, they can have no rights
greater than those provided by their clients’ legal entitlements and those rights
conferred by agency law. Agency law vests the authority in the client to
determine the objectives of the representation and, implicitly, to judge the
moral worth of her own project. If the lawyer has agreed to represent a client,
the lawyer’s moral qualms about the client’s goals are simply irrelevant to the
lawyer’s professionally prescribed duties of assisting the client in carrying
them out using lawful means. In my view, even the decision whether to
represent a particular client, which in American law is almost entirely
discretionary with the lawyer, should be made with due recognition of the
importance of the social value of legality, and should not be influenced by the
lawyer’s moral disagreement with the client, except in unusual circumstances.6
This conclusion is supported not only by the conceptual argument just
suggested, relying on the social function of law, but also by the implicit
contract between the legal profession and society as a whole. This tacit
agreement establishes certain privileges for the legal profession, including a
valuable monopoly over the provision of what are deemed to be “legal”
services, in exchange for an undertaking by the profession to use its expertise
for the benefit of society. Notwithstanding occasional rhetorical flourishes by
leaders of the organized bar, the legal profession has never seriously claimed
that its members should be regarded as moral experts.
Other than the clergy, no profession in modern society makes the claim to
be better at making moral decisions than its clients (and of course even the
clergy’s claim is bitterly contested). Although law is a richly normative
domain, full of value-laden concepts like fairness, loyalty, dignity, autonomy,
well-being, reasonable care, and good faith, lawyers understand these concepts
to have specific legal meanings, as terms of art. Karl Llewellyn may have
5. Cf. RHODE, supra note 2, at 58 (arguing that lawyers should “act on the basis of their
principled convictions, even when they recognize that others could in good faith hold different
views”).
6. See W. Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics: The
Problem of Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987 (2006). At several points in this essay I
cite papers I have written, not because I believe my own work to be authoritative as such, but as a
way of referring to lengthier arguments in support of some of the points made here. My views on
teaching legal ethics depend on my position on the nature of the subject itself, which can only be
briefly summarized here.
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poured it on a bit thick when he said, in a lecture to beginning law students that
the job of the first year of law school is “to knock your ethics into temporary
anesthesia. . . . along with woozy thinking,” but he was making an important
conceptual point, that law school aims to teach how to “work within a body of
materials that is given.”7 Ethics and law are “given” in a different way, and the
working material of lawyers is that which is deemed relevant by the
professional community to the process of legal interpretation.8 Other ethical
values are familiar in legal reasoning in the guise of rationales for judicial
decisions or the policies underlying legal norms, which help give content to the
norms and guide their application. Even if they have analogues in ordinary
moral life, however, these legal policy/moral concepts and values take on a
specific meaning in legal contexts, which is all that lawyers are professionally
concerned with. Of course lawyers remain moral agents even when acting in a
professional capacity, but their non-legal moral beliefs should not be permitted
to influence their interpretation and application of legal norms.
The following section sets out briefly the sociological and jurisprudential
arguments for constructing a technical domain of professional expertise for
lawyers, separate from the practices of ordinary moral reasoning. If that
argument is successful, then the implication for the teaching of legal ethics is
that a law school legal ethics course should focus on the values of lawyering
that are imminent within the law governing lawyers—values such as fiduciary
obligation and candor to third parties—and not purport to address the way
people make moral judgments in ordinary life. Consideration of ethics in this
way would be no different than talking about the value of efficiency in a torts
class or the duty of loyalty in corporate law. These are no less “values” for
being incorporated into legal reasoning, but they are not distinctive as part of
some special domain of “ethics” either. Classroom teachers in law schools can
handle legal ethics in the same way as they treat any other policy discussion.
In my view, the discipline of legal ethics has suffered from self-imposed
mystification that relies upon an implicit belief that ethical reasoning for
lawyers is a skill that cannot be taught in traditional law school courses.
Perhaps ethical reasoning in general cannot be taught—I am actually agnostic
on whether this is so—but for the purposes of training lawyers, ordinary
classroom faculty are perfectly competent to handle the task.

7. K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 116 (Oceana
Publ’ns 1996) (1930).
8. See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167
(2005).
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II. THE EXPERTISE OF LAWYERS
One of the central issues in the theory of professions is the nature of
legitimation. Professions claim privileges vis-à-vis the state and other social
institutions—they define the nature of their work, restrict entry, regulate
themselves, and enlist the assistance of the state to limit competition from
other service providers.9 As a consequence, professions are relatively
insulated from both political pressure (through regulation by politically
responsive branches) and market forces. These prerogatives, which have
usefully been labeled “guild power,”10 obviously require some sort of
justification in terms of values that have some currency in the broader society
in which the profession is embedded. The standard justification of the
professional monopoly has several independent branches.11 The first is
pragmatic: Self-regulation is a consequence of the difficulty in evaluating the
performance of professionals—if a great deal of training and experience is
required to discern problems requiring the application of professional judgment
and to judge the best way to solve them, then only other professionals are
competent to evaluate the performance of tasks within the professional domain.
The second branch is more explicitly normative: Professions claim that the
ends served by a profession are socially valuable.12 Health in the case of
medicine, justice in the case of law, spiritual guidance in the case of the clergy,
and so on, are the sorts of goods that a society would like to see produced. The
pragmatic and normative branches are then melded in the argument that
insulation from competitive and regulatory pressures is necessary in order to
create the conditions under which these valuable ends will be served.13
I am interested in a variation on this pattern of legitimation, associated
with the Weberian tradition in sociology, in which professions claim rational,

9. See RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE: THE
POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM 471 (2003).
10. ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE
ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT passim (1996).
11. See Eliot Friedson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS /
LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 215 (Robert
L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
12. See, e.g., ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE
DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 184–86 (1988).
13. See, e.g., TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND
PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 34 (1987) (“When each profession is pressed back to the bedrock
of its authority, when its legitimacy is questioned at the most generic level, at that point
professions retreat ultimately to the distinctive means by which their knowledge is created and the
distinctive class of statements produced by that means.”); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE
OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 23 (1977) (“[O]nly in a quasi-monopolistic
situation can the producers be supervised and a minimum of ‘professional’ competence
obtained.”).
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value-free, “scientific” competence over some domain of technical problems.14
The Weberian conception of expertise insists that the application of
professional skill be value-free, neutral, and objective.15 Claiming that
professional knowledge is neutral and scientific connects the profession with
highly culturally salient values of technical expertise and objectivity.16 To
modern American ears, the equation of law with science sounds anachronistic,
associated as it is with Langdell’s pedagogical innovations and a longdiscredited view of adjudication as the mechanical application of formal
norms. The vast majority of the world’s lawyers, however, work within the
civil law tradition in which the logical, formal, scientific rationality of law is
taken as given, at least in the rhetoric of legal education and legal
scholarship.17 And even within the American profession there are vestiges of
the Weberian idea that legal professionalism is primarily a matter of neutral
technical expertise. A study conducted by several prominent legal sociologists
for the American Bar Association (ABA) Section on Litigation revealed a
pervasive attitude among large-firm litigators that moral dialogue with clients
and making moral judgments in connection with representation were simply
not a feature of the professional role.18 In response to interviews based on
hypothetical scenarios (including the well known Fisons discovery abuse
case), partners and associates interviewed made comments such as:
I personally would have a problem even conveying my own view of the
morality of the situation to a client. I think morality is a very slippery concept,
primarily in the eye of the beholder.
I don’t think there’s really a market at this point for being an incredibly ethical
lawyer.
[The client] can go [to] his minister if he wants moral advice. That’s not why
he’s coming to you.

14. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis, Putting Law Back into the Sociology of
Lawyers, in 3 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 478, 502–04 (Richard L. Abel &
Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1989); Robert Granfield, Lawyers and Power: Reproduction and
Resistance in the Legal Profession, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 205, 207–08 (1996) (reviewing
RONAN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995)).
15. See Granfield, supra note 14, at 207.
16. ABBOTT, supra note 12, at 53–54; LARSON, supra note 13, at 22, 40–42.
17. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 61–67 (2d ed. 1985).
18. See Douglas N. Frenkel et al., Introduction, Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of
Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (1998).
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What you are really talking around here is in fact a fundamental precept of the
profession, . . . that clients . . . are entitled to representation by trained and
19
skilled individuals who operate within the system.

Although big-firm lawyers probably like to affect an attitude of world-weary
cynicism, these comments do reflect a sense that their job is too highly
complex, technical, and value-free, and that the moral issues raised by their
work are simply someone else’s problem.20 If the work of lawyers was
inextricably bound up with contestable moral and political values, however,
one might be concerned that the profession was acting as a kind of antidemocratic elite, either by restricting access to its services to those clients
deemed “worthy”21 or by manipulating the legal process to favor the interests
of the powerful.22 In other words, the equation of legal judgment with neutral,
technical expertise buttresses the case for the professional monopoly, because
lawyers are not claiming the authority to perform tasks (e.g., exercise moral
judgment) that ordinary people are able to do for themselves.
All of this is familiar, even banal. Despite the pervasiveness among
practicing lawyers of this Weberian stance toward their work, it is now taken
for granted among most professional responsibility teachers that the role of a
lawyer requires the exercise of moral discretion. In fact, a common line of
criticism leveled against the standard professional responsibility curriculum,
consisting of the ABA’s Model Rules and cases applying them, is that it

19. Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional,
Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors That Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and
Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 778–80 (1998).
20. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS.
1, 8 (1975). Wasserstrom described, but did not endorse the received view among lawyers that
[t]he job of the lawyer . . . is not to approve or disapprove of the character of his or her
client, the cause for which the client seeks the lawyer’s assistance, or the avenues
provided by the law to achieve that which the client wants to accomplish. The lawyer’s
task is, instead, to provide that competence which the client lacks and the lawyer, as
professional, possesses.
Id. For a strong statement of the view Wasserstrom describes, see Lee Modjeska, On Teaching
Morality to Law Students, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 71, 73 (1991) (disapproving, in hindsight, his own
moral advice to a client not to throw employees out of work on Christmas Eve, and stating that
his own professional competence was questionable since he dared suggest that the client’s
business plan might be morally problematic). Modjeska’s self-flagellation is unwarranted,
because the lawyer’s role clearly permits advising clients on the basis of non-legal considerations
“such as moral, economic, social and political factors.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
2.1 (2007).
21. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (expressing concern about rule by an
“oligarchy of lawyers”).
22. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 19 (1989) (“Despite the efforts of
lawyers to portray law as a logically deductive system, the public clearly sees it as a human
construct and thus a reflection of political power.”).
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squeezes the ethics out of what should be a rich normative domain.23
(Teachers who are criticized for teaching primarily the law of lawyering may
be reacting to the implicit hierarchy of the curriculum constructed by law
students, who consider doctrinal courses more “real” or legitimate than
interdisciplinary offerings.24) By beginning with the problem of professional
legitimation, however, we can ask why this must be so, and further we can
look more closely at the jurisprudential basis for the belief that teaching
lawyers involves teaching something about the making of moral judgments.
My claim is, perhaps surprisingly, a variation on the idea that professional
expertise is primarily technical, gaining its legitimacy from its neutrality and
objectivity. By this I do not mean that legal norms are devoid of moral
content, only that moral principles must be incorporated into legal norms
somehow in order to be the sort of things that lawyers are permitted to consider
when acting in a representative capacity.25 Nor does this mean that lawyers
cannot engage their clients in a moral dialogue; counseling on non-legal
matters is permitted by the law of lawyering as well as long professional
tradition.26 In my view, however, the authority of law is dependent on its
capacity to supersede moral controversy and establish a relatively stable basis
for peaceful coexistence and cooperative activity among people who disagree
profoundly at the level of first-order ethical principles.27 It follows that the
role of lawyers is twofold: to enable citizens to coordinate their activities with
others using an orderly framework, and to maintain the legal system in a
healthy, functioning state and not undermine the settlement achieved by the
law through evasion or manipulation.
The alternative to this conception of lawyering, which would require
lawyers to make moral judgments, would have to build in ethical discretion at

23. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65
TEX. L. REV. 963 (1987); William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEG. EDUC. 65
(1991).
24. See, e.g., Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A
Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247.
25. See W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005).
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007). I have referred to this as
“freestanding moral advice.” See Wendel, supra note 25, at 110–12. Regarding professional
tradition, here is the place for the obligatory cite to the quote from Elihu Root, that “half the
practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and
should stop.” See PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938); see also Amy Gutmann, Can
Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759 (1993) (recommending that lawyers be
prepared to deliberate with their clients about what is right, rather than either refusing to do
wrong or attempting to manipulate the client into doing the right thing); Pepper, supra note 21, at
630–32 (encouraging lawyers to engage clients in moral dialogue).
27. See W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004).
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either of two points. Either (1) the client has a legal entitlement but it is
morally problematic, or (2) the existence of the client’s legal entitlement
depends on a moral judgment. The first alternative undermines the
profession’s claimed basis of legitimacy, while the second raises serious
jurisprudential problems. Regarding (1), there are undoubtedly many legal
entitlements which legally permit a person to do something that is morally
wrong.28 The proverbial case of throwing workers out of a job on Christmas
Eve is such an example.29 There seems to be no harm in permitting lawyers—
or anyone, for that matter—to try to argue another person out of a morally
wrongful course of action. As noted above, the law governing lawyers
expressly permits lawyers to seek to persuade their clients to modify their
actions in light of moral concerns.30 However, it is not necessarily an
implication of the permissibility of offering moral advice that lawyers ought to
conceive moral advising as a significant aspect of their role, nor that legal
educators should be concerned with training lawyers to be better moral
decision-makers.
The spheres of authority of professionals can be divided into technical
authority and normative domains, differentiating for example between how
best to build a road (a question within the technical authority of engineers) and
whether a particular road should be built (a policy question perhaps within the
moral authority of policy and planning experts).31 For any given profession,
there is accordingly a jurisdictional question concerning the scope of its
authority, the answer to which “rests significantly on [its] epistemological
foundations.”32 Having secure epistemological foundations for expertise is a
function both of the subject itself and the ability to train people to use that
knowledge. If most moral decision-making by lawyers related to category (1),
legal but immoral acts by clients, lawyers should be expected to demonstrate
both a sufficiently objective moral epistemology and their superior capacity for
making moral judgments. Otherwise these judgments should not be committed
to professionals, but should be reserved to the clients themselves, because
lawyers act as agents of clients and their legal authority is derivative of the
legal entitlements of clients. And indeed as a matter of agency law, the
normative domain of authority is regarded as the client’s alone, leaving the
lawyer with authority over technical matters.33 If a client wishes to do
28. See Jeremy Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong, 92 ETHICS 21 (1981).
29. See Modjeska, supra note 20, at 73.
30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., HALLIDAY, supra note 13, at 38–39. I use the term normative instead of
Halliday’s term “moral,” because many non-technical judgments made by experts rely on nonmoral norms such as efficiency.
32. Id. at 40.
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21(3) & cmts. d & e
(2000).
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something legal but immoral, the lawyer’s role is arguably only to provide the
means for accomplishing the client’s goal, at least after attempts at counseling
and persuasion have failed.34 In other words, the normative question—
analogous to “Should this road be built?”—is one on which we do not believe
lawyers have comparatively greater expertise.35
As a theoretical matter, this allocation of authority presupposes certain
assumptions about ethical reasoning and the nature of objectivity in ethics, and
the nature of the expertise of lawyers. In particular, it assumes that lawyers do
not have special competence at discovering ethical truths.36 The situation
would be different if Kant’s dream were realized, in which reason itself
demanded obedience to certain moral principles, the content of which was
apparent to all rational beings.37 However, common experience leads us to
question whether Kant’s dream will ever be anything other than an ideal at
which philosophical ethics may aim. For any interesting moral issue—say,
capital punishment, abortion, stem-cell research, affirmative action, racial
profiling, or the permissibility of coercive interrogation techniques—people
appear to continue to disagree in good faith about what morality permits or
requires. Disagreement alone does not necessarily imply anything about the
nature of ethical reasoning, but it would be surprising if there were a reliable
moral epistemology for discovering and verifying the existence of moral facts,
34. I say “arguably” because lawyers have discretion not to represent particular clients. See
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 571, § 10.2.2 (1986). Once the representation
has begun, a lawyer also has discretion to withdraw from representing a client if the lawyer finds
the client’s goals repugnant. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2007).
As I have argued elsewhere, however, the law of lawyering contains an implicit cab-rank
principle that morally motivated refusals to represent clients (or to withdraw from representation)
should be reserved only for extreme cases in which the lawyer’s disagreement with the client’s
goals is so fundamental that the lawyer is in effect rendered incompetent to provide effective
representation. See Wendel, supra note 6, at 998–1000.
35. Cf. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1080 (1976) (“In a democratic society, justice has no anointed
priests. Every citizen has the same duty to work for the establishment of just institutions, and the
lawyer has no special moral responsibilities in that regard.”).
36. William Simon performs a nice theoretical reversal on defenders of the standard
libertarian view of legal ethics by conceding that lawyers do not necessarily have greater
expertise in moral reasoning as compared with their clients, but then locating the relevant ethical
values within the domain of law, in which lawyers do have comparatively greater expertise. See
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1113–14 (1988).
Simon is also correct that distinctions between spheres of technical and normative authority
“depend on important issues of legal theory that all lawyers need to resolve.” Id. at 1114. A
great deal of my own recent work is aimed at understanding the legal theoretic questions raised
by the distinction between moral and legal obligation.
37. See SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING
214–16 (1998) (using the metaphor of Kant’s dream to describe the ideal of ethics as stating
authoritative, compulsory principles that are binding on all rational beings in virtue of their
rationality).
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yet we have not yet seen the effects of its use. The hypothesis more consistent
with the evidence seems to be that even if there are facts about the world that
warrant the truth of propositions of ethics, “there is no privileged, easy, or
uncontroversial access to them; there is certainly no mode of belief which is
straightforwardly and indubitably reflective of the facts’ solidity.”38 Moreover,
even if Kant’s dream came true for all rational beings, there would be no
reason to commit ethical decision-making to lawyers, unless legal education
somehow made lawyers better at engaging in the reasoning process that led to
the discovery of ethical truths.
There is much more that can be said here, apropos of the nature of ethical
reasoning, and particularly the case for pluralism as opposed to skepticism or
relativism. However, there is room here only to summarize briefly. In my
view, the persistence of moral controversy is not the result of any dysfunction
in ethical reasoning, but of the structure of value itself, with its diversity of
authentically valuable human goods and forms of life. This is a well known
position in political theory, and it is making inroads in the theory of legal
ethics.39 What may not be fully appreciated, however, is the necessity of the
connection between some degree of value pluralism and the arguments that are
often given in support of the technocratic, value-neutral, Weberian conception
of lawyering expertise we are considering here. The familiar libertarian
defense of this conception, offered by Stephen Pepper, Monroe Freedman, and
others, is that clients should have the autonomy to arrange their affairs and
dealings with others in any way they see fit, subject only to the constraints of
positive law, enacted through legitimate processes.40 This argument is subject
to a number of familiar objections: clients are entitled only to a just measure of
autonomy, autonomously chosen ends are valuable only if the ends themselves
are valuable, and even if autonomy has some positive value, helping someone
exercise autonomy to do something bad is not turned into a morally

38. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 175 (1999).
39. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 21–26
(1996); STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 30–33 (1989); CHARLES E.
LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE:
A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 6–11 (2d ed. 1984); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54–58
(1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322–66 (1986); Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of
the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 1–2 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991); THOMAS
NAGEL, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128–41 (1979). For other scholars
considering the implications of value pluralism in legal ethics, see, for example, Katherine R.
Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389 (2005);
Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Society, 63 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 984 (1995).
40. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 1.05
(2d ed. 2002); Pepper, supra note 21, at 616–17.
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praiseworthy act by the presence of the positive value of autonomy.41 I think a
stronger case can be made, however, if autonomy is understood as a
consequence of the plurality of worthwhile forms of life and conceptions of the
good. As Joseph Raz has pointed out, “Autonomy requires that many morally
acceptable options be available to a person.”42 In addition, there must be some
reason to choose among these various options—being able to choose between
two identical things is not autonomy.43 This means that autonomy necessarily
involves tradeoffs between things that have value, which is to say choices that
different people might make differently, even if both were deliberating
carefully and acting in good faith.
The implication for legal ethics is when lawyers are acting in a
representative capacity, where legal entitlements to morally wrongful conduct
are concerned, they must be careful not to interfere with their clients’
autonomy to do things that they would regard as wrongful, from the point of
view of their own value commitments and form of life. A lawyer’s moral
integrity, in the sense of her own ideals and ambitions that constitute the form
of life she aims to live by,44 is not the source of value in the lawyer-client
relationship. Rather, the moral worth of the relationship is based on the
legitimacy of the law from the point of view of citizens. The law establishes at
least a provisional settlement of normative conflict that is sufficiently stable
and clear that it provides the basis for coordinated action despite what would
otherwise be interminable moral conflict.
For example, citizens and
government officials may disagree in good faith about what sorts of
interrogation techniques are permissible when dealing with members of a
group that pose a serious threat to national security.45 Is it permissible to force
prisoners to stand in uncomfortable positions, bombard them with sound and
light, or trick them into believing that they have been handed over to foreign
security forces who are known for their ruthlessness? In a situation like this, it
is apparent that even sincere, well-meaning people deliberating in good faith
are unlikely to reach agreement at the level of specificity that is needed. (It is
not enough to say that interrogations must respect the human rights of
detainees—what those rights require is exactly what interrogators want to

41. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 166–69 (1988);
WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 26–52 (1998);
Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 42, 47 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); David
Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 637 (1986).
42. RAZ, supra note 39, at 378.
43. Id. at 398.
44. See Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 209, 238–39 (2003).
45. For this example, see Wendel, supra note 25, at 93–98.
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know.) In addition, it is apparent that something must be done, and if there is
no agreement on what ought to be done, then interrogators will be acting
without guidance. Despite the lack of agreement on substance, it may be
possible to reach agreement on a fair procedure that can be used to construct a
normative framework for action, which is good enough, for now, to
accomplish the goal that everyone shares—namely, of defending national
security while respecting the human rights of detainees.
A significant implication of this proceduralist view of legal legitimacy is
that the moral beliefs of lawyers, or any citizens for that matter, are treated as a
contribution to a conversation or positions in a debate, but are never allowed to
conclusively resolve the disagreement. Resolution falls to procedures adopted
in the name of society as a whole, designed to reach a provisional settlement.
After that settlement has been reached, lawyers as interpreters and
implementers of law have an obligation not to “unsettle the settlement” by reintroducing contested moral beliefs into the process of interpretation. This
raises the second possibility, considered above, namely whether moral
judgment may be necessary to determine whether a client has a legal
entitlement.46 If the law is to fulfill its role of settling moral conflict and
providing a stable basis for cooperative activity, it must be possible to identify
the law without reference to contested moral issues.47 This does not mean that
moral values can never be incorporated into law.48 In fact, moral concepts like
reasonable care, good faith and fair dealing, and loyalty to shareholders are
perfectly familiar to lawyers. Significantly, however, they are familiar as legal
concepts. Failing to exercise reasonable care for the purposes of tort liability
may be different from the kind of failure of caring that would make a person
morally blameworthy. (A clear illustration of this distinction is the lack of a

46. For more on the relationship between moral reasons and legal entitlements, see id. at
100–09.
47. See, e.g., ROGER SHINER, NORM AND NATURE: THE MOVEMENTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT
53 (1992).
48. Raz insists that moral values are not incorporated into law merely because decisionmakers take them into account; human decision-makers must take moral reasons into account in
any case. See Joseph Raz, Incorporation By Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2004). This may be true
in the first instance of would-be incorporation, but once a moral reason is given in justification of
a legal judgment, it becomes relevant to ascertaining the law in future cases. In common law
reasoning, determining the holding of a case requires understanding the reasons behind the
judgment, which may be pragmatic (as in concerns about the administrability of a rule),
hermeneutic (as where the interpretation of a precedent was an issue in the case), or moral. All of
these styles of reasoning have analogues in ordinary practical and moral life, but when employed
by judges they have a distinctively legal form. In the end I do not think anything of importance
turns on the term “incorporation,” as long as we recognize that the law makes use of concepts that
have exact equivalents or at least analogues in ordinary moral reasoning, but that legal
interpretation takes them into account only insofar as they feature in the practice of justifying
legal judgments.
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legal duty to rescue someone in peril, which may be morally required in many
circumstances.)49 The concept of taking care may develop different contours
in law and morality, and require different conduct from those subject to legal
and moral duties. Another example of this distinction between moral and legal
obligation is the legal ethics classic Zabella v. Pakel,50 in which a wealthy man
asserted the statute of limitations to avoid paying a debt he clearly (morally,
justly) owed to a less fortunate plaintiff.51
Even if moral principles and legal principles require identical actions in a
given case, the nature and source of the duties are still analytically distinct.52
The most important difference is that if a moral principle is incorporated into
law, it is not necessary to ascertain the truth of the principle to determine
whether one has a (legal) obligation to act. So, if a court permits recovery of
damages for emotional distress on the grounds that the defendant’s conduct
was “extreme and outrageous,”53 a lawyer interpreting that case does not ask
whether the defendant’s conduct was really extreme and outrageous. In the
same vein, if a citizen sincerely believes, on the basis of moral reflection, that
the conduct was not extreme and outrageous, she is not thereby legally entitled
to engage in it. Obligation, for both citizens and lawyers, is not a result of the
direct impact of morality, but of morality filtered through law—with a certain
legal “pedigree,” as Dworkin would put it.54 To put it extremely, simply, and
schematically, outrageousness as a moral concept (call it OM) creates moral
obligations not to do certain things, while outrageousness as a legal concept
(call it OL), which may overlap to a greater or lesser extent with OM, creates
legal obligations not to do other things. The recognition that something is
outrageous creates an obligation not to inflict mental suffering and humiliation
on another person, but there are different obligations in virtue of the legal and
moral values of outrageousness. If OM and OL both require something—say,
employers to refrain from using racial epithets to describe employees55—then a
citizen has a moral and legal obligation not to use racial epithets. On the other
hand, there may be cases in which OM forbids something that OL permits, such
as the use of racial epithets in non-employment contexts.56 Although there is

49. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1981).
50. 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957).
51. Id. at 455.
52. For contrasting theories both accepting the analytic separability of law and morality—
i.e., the claim of legal positivism—see JULES COLEMAN, Negative and Positive Positivism, in
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 3–27 (1988); JOSEPH RAZ, The Problem About the Nature of
Law, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 194–221 (1994).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
54. See RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14–23
(1977).
55. See, e.g., Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1998).
56. See, e.g., Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc., 360 N.E.2d 983 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
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probably little moral disagreement that the use of racial epithets is wrong, the
law of torts has for various reasons (including the difficulty of drawing bright
lines in this area and a general aversion to the litigation of non-physical harms)
declined to impose legal liability on people who engage in this conduct. Thus,
on the fanciful assumption that a client has come to a lawyer to find out
whether it is legally permissible to use a particular term (perhaps in a public
performance or a newspaper article), the answer would depend on whether the
proposed course of action was outrageous in the sense of exhibiting OL. The
lawyer may also offer freestanding moral advice, based on the lawyer’s best
understanding of OM, but this would be irrelevant to the client’s question
regarding legal permission.57 The client may appreciate the freestanding moral
advice or may resent it, but in any event the legal profession does not seek to
justify its monopoly over the provision of certain kinds of services, namely
giving legal advice, with reference to the expertise of lawyers in making moral
judgments.
I do not deny the possibility that a lawyer may sincerely believe that
assisting her client in realizing her legal entitlements may implicate the lawyer
in moral wrongdoing by the client.58 As a matter of practical reasoning, the
lawyer should regard the law as an authoritative source of obligations, except
in the most extreme cases of grossly immoral laws. Agency law, which creates
the lawyers’ obligation to carry out the client’s lawful instructions, together
with the client’s legal entitlement, creates a duty to participate in conduct that
is legal but morally wrong from the lawyer’s point of view. However, as a
matter of theoretical reasoning, a lawyer may continue to believe that the
action, though obligatory, is wrong. The possibility of viewing an act from
multiple perspectives—required by practical reasoning but viewed to be wrong
from the theoretical point of view—may strike some as incoherent, but I
believe it is one way of recognizing the weight and persistence of moral values
that arise from social roles and ordinary pre-social morality. Although I have
argued that, as a matter of practical reasoning, the authority of law operates as
an exclusionary reason vis-à-vis ordinary morality,59 that does not mean that
ordinary moral reasons just vanish into the ether. As Gerald Postema states:
[I]t is not enough for one to work out the correct course of action and pursue it.
It is also important that one appreciate the moral costs of that course of action.

57. As I have argued elsewhere, the law can create legal obligations where moral obligations
are absent, and even where most people making “all-things-considered” moral judgments would
agree that a person has no such moral obligation. See W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens,
and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (2006) (discussing hypothetical from
Frederick Schauer, Critical Notice, 24 CAN. J. PHIL. 495, 499–501 (1994)).
58. The discussion in this paragraph is drawn from Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility
in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980).
59. See Wendel, supra note 27.
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This appreciation will be expressed in a genuine reluctance to bring about the
60
injury, and a sense of the accompanying loss or sacrifice.

The law and traditions governing the attorney-client relationship do permit the
lawyer to discuss these “moral costs” with the client, but to emphasize, if the
client instructs the lawyer to assist the client in a lawful course of action, the
lawyer must comply. But the lawyer may do so with an accompanying feeling
of regret, as a moral sentiment appropriate to having participated in justified
wrongdoing. Indeed, we may judge a lawyer who does not experience the
appropriate sentiment as being somehow deficient in character.
Postema worries that a lawyer will be less skillful as a lawyer if she
becomes accustomed to making judgments that are detached from their sources
in ordinary moral experience, beliefs, and attitudes.61 In his view, lawyers are
often called upon to use their moral faculties, deliberate, reason, and argue
about matters related to justice. Thus, he rejects conceiving of legal ethics as
“the artificial reason of professional morality, which rests on claims of
specialized knowledge and specialize analytical technique.”62 In other words,
he resists the Weberian conception I have been defending. It is true that
lawyers make arguments in the public sphere on matters concerning morals
and justice. But I am willing to bite the bullet and say that these arguments do
pertain to an artificial kind of justice—the justice which represents the agreedup provisional settlement of normative conflict.63 We cannot build up
professional ethics on a foundation of “real” justice, because it is too
contestable. Lawyers could never facilitate the effective functioning of a
large-scale cooperative scheme if professional ethics were completely
transparent, as it were, to ordinary moral scrutiny, so that professional
obligations were genuinely binding only and to the extent that they overlapped
with ordinary moral duties. As for the argument that this artificial morality
cuts lawyers off from resources they need to fashion arguments regarding
client rights and duties,64 it is actually an important part of the professional
judgment of lawyers to be able to distinguish between ordinary moral notions
(justice, reasonable care, etc.) and legal concepts. Lawyers who participate in
the argumentative practices of this artificial universe may lose sensitivity to the
costs of their actions in ordinary moral terms. That is a serious problem for
professional ethics, but it does not threaten the competence of lawyers as
lawyers; rather, it makes it essential for lawyers to continue to engage in
theoretical as well as practical reasoning about moral problems.

60. Postema, supra note 58, at 70.
61. Id. at 75–76, 79.
62. Id. at 76.
63. Cf. Fried, supra note 35, at 1084 (“[O]ne must not transfer uncritically the whole range
of personal moral scruples into the arena of [the attorney-client relationship.]”).
64. Postema, supra note 58, at 79.
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III. RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL ETHICS
The Weberian conception of professional expertise defended in Part II
does not incorporate moral judgment as a significant component of the
structure of the lawyer-client relationship. As I have argued elsewhere, there is
a difference between justifying institutions and practices as a whole, and
justifying actions falling within those practices.65 If there are good moral
reasons for citizens and lawyers to respect the settlement achieved by the law,
which permits coordinated action despite moral disagreement, then citizens
and lawyers have a moral obligation to do what is legally required in a given
case, even if they believe this requirement does not overlap with the
requirements of ordinary morality. Judgments that look moral (e.g., “the
directors violated their duty of loyalty to shareholders”) are actually legal
judgments when the relevant moral norms are incorporated into the law.
Therefore, when acting in a representative capacity, a lawyer is not engaged in
making ordinary moral judgments, except in highly unusual circumstances.66
That does not mean, however, that there is no such thing as legal ethics,
apart from the disciplinary rules and the broader law governing lawyers. The
function of law creates a strong obligation, as part of the role of a lawyer, to
treat the law as a social achievement worthy of respect and fidelity, not merely
an inconvenient obstacle to be planned around in pursuit of the client’s ends. I
have argued that in several recent high-profile legal ethics scandals—including
the Enron collapse, the marketing of fraudulent tax shelter opinions, and the
approval by government lawyers of the use of torture in the interrogation of
detainees—the principal ethical dereliction was the failure of lawyers to
interpret legal norms in good faith, with due respect for the meaning of the
law, considered from a relatively objective and impartial point of view.67 That
is the violation of an ethical obligation, but not one that arises from ordinary
moral values. Rather, the duty arises from the recognition of the shared value
of a settlement of normative controversy that enables people who profoundly
disagree to cooperate toward the realization of common projects, such as
efficient financial markets and national security. When lawyers make
frivolous statutory interpretation arguments in order to narrow the definition of
the term “torture” to exclude a variety of techniques that would be deemed
65. See Wendel, supra note 6, at 989 (discussing Rawls’s practical theory of rules in John
Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955)).
66. Any theory of obedience to law, however strong, has to have a “safety valve” for legal
requirements that are so obviously immoral that they cannot represent the resolution of issues on
which it is possible for people to disagree in good faith. In my view, it is important to set the
threshold for opting out of professional obligations at a high level; otherwise all the moral
disagreement that the law supersedes would be reintroduced as lawyers referred back to ordinary
moral values to justify their decision not to represent particular clients, or not to take certain legal
actions on behalf of clients. See Wendel, supra note 27, at 417 n.190.
67. See Wendel, supra note 8, at 1210–32.
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torture under a good faith interpretation of applicable domestic and
international law,68 or when they approve structured-finance transactions that
comply in a superficial way with accounting rules but plainly are not the sorts
of transactions for which the rules were intended,69 they are treating the law
with a disrespectful instrumental attitude, not acting as trustees of the law.
Lawyers may not have greater expertise than their clients or regulators in
working out, through a process of moral reasoning, the circumstances under
which it might be permissible to deprive a detainee of sleep in order to obtain
information that could be used to unwind a terrorist plot. They do, however,
have a considerable comparative advantage in understanding the relevant legal
norms. Failing to treat these norms as legitimate sources of reasons that their
clients must take into account is an ethical failing, with respect to the law.
This is the sense in which the role of lawyers incorporates both law and ethics.
The disrespect for the law displayed by the lawyers in the Enron, tax
shelter, and torture memo cases do not appear out of nowhere. As legal
educators, we should ask whether law school somehow creates an attitude of
“anti-ethics” characterized by “numbness to ethical difficulties of practice, and,
far worse, a cavalier attitude toward the responsibilities lawyers have to clients
and the public.”70 Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence suggests that some law
schools do tend to encourage this stance, either through overt disparagement of
legal ethics or, more commonly, through more subtle signals of the marginality
of these issues.
Professional responsibility teachers often quote the
observation of David Luban and Michael Millemann, that their subject is “the
dog of the curriculum, despised by students, taught by overworked deans or
underpaid adjuncts and generally disregarded by the faculty at large.”71
Students may come to regard the subject as a “dog” long before they enter a
professional responsibility classroom if they are attentive to the tacit norms of
the legal academy, which valorizes a certain attitude toward the law,
particularly “an instrumental approach to law and lawyering [and] a ‘toughminded’ and analytical attitude toward legal tasks and professional rules.”72
Whether they intend to send this message or not, all law teachers, not just those
who regard themselves as formally teaching professional responsibility,
convey implicit messages about the way lawyers should interpret and apply the

68. See Wendel, supra note 25, at 80–85.
69. See Wendel, supra note 8, at 1221–24.
70. Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of
Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 154 (1996).
71. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 37–38 (1995).
72. See Cramton, supra note 23, at 248.
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law to their clients’ situations.73 These signals may be deeply embedded in the
structure of the law school curriculum, which emphasizes hard cases, the
indeterminacy of law, and the political basis for judicial decisions.74 Or they
may be conveyed more overtly, by teachers who adopt the “tough-minded”
stance of an unreasonably stripped-down rational choice approach.75
If we hope to counteract the instrumentalist attitude toward the law that
characterizes the recent legal ethics debacles, professional responsibility
scholars have to engage with the broader academic and professional
communities. My own work in the theory of legal ethics is motivated by the
conviction that the practice of moral judgment for lawyers acting in a
representative capacity is categorically different from ordinary moral
reasoning. Although I know a bit about philosophical ethical theory, I do not
claim to be any better at moral reasoning than the average person; I suspect
most law teachers would feel the same way. But as lawyers and legal scholars,
we do have considerable expertise at addressing the technical questions
presented by our clients legal problems. To extend the theme of this essay, we
should not misconceive the nature of the expertise of the subdiscipline of
professional responsibility teaching. The aim of professional responsibility
courses should not be to enhance students’ capacity to exercise reflective moral
judgment.76 Not only is it difficult to fit all of the complexities of the law
governing lawyers into a three-hour course, but more to the point, the real
problem of legal ethics is how to get lawyers to take the law seriously.
Anything a professional responsibility teacher says in his or her own course
may be undermined by an implicit message that the law is only instrumentally
significant, and can be planned around and nullified by a sufficiently clever
lawyer. If my colleagues teaching securities law tell students that the lawyers
representing Enron in its structured-finance deals did nothing wrong, the
students would take that as a credible statement about what the law allows, and
the burden would then be upon me as a professional responsibility teacher to
convince them that they should not assist their client in obtaining a legal
entitlement. If my argument were, in effect, that it’s a rotten thing to do, the
students would justifiably feel that I have no greater expertise than they do
with respect to figuring out what is a morally rotten thing to do. If, on the
other hand, the message is conveyed that the legal arguments employed by the
73. Susan P. Koniak & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the Signs, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 118–19 (1995) (arguing that whether law schools acknowledge it or not,
they teach ethics “pervasively” whenever professors talk about what a lawyer should do).
74. See Cramton, supra note 23, at 254–55.
75. See W. Bradley Wendel, Symposium Introduction: Economic Rationality vs. Ethical
Reasonableness: The Relevance of Law and Economics for Legal Ethics, 8 LEGAL ETHICS 107
(2005) (discussing a review symposium on RANDAL GRAHAM, LEGAL ETHICS (2004)).
76. Cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 42–43,
51 (1992).
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Enron lawyers are lousy legal arguments, we as legal educators are acting
within the domain of our expertise.
The arguments presented here may also support expanding efforts to
incorporate professional responsibility education into clinical settings, where
students deal simultaneously with the law governing their clients’ problems
and the law governing their own conduct as lawyers. It may even be the case
that the only “real” ethical education occurs in conjunction with students
imaginatively or actually entering the role of lawyers for real or hypothetical
clients. Having said this, however, I do not want to suggest that there is no
role for the traditional three-credit professional responsibility course. I only
insist that we not confuse the role of that course with teaching ethics. The law
governing lawyers is an important and interesting subject in its own right, and
students should not graduate from law school without being able to deal with
fairly complex conflict of interest, attorney-client privilege, or clientwrongdoing problems. As that body of law has grown and matured over the
last few decades, many law schools have found it helpful to hire specialists in
the law governing lawyers to teach the required professional responsibility
course. This seems like a positive development, and not only because it
provides job security for a whole cadre of law teachers. But the law governing
lawyers is not ethics, and we as legal scholars are right to continue to question
how ethics is taught. My goal in this essay is to establish the way in which law
and ethics interact, and thus to point the way toward a more comprehensive
approach to teaching professional responsibility.

